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Experiment 1 tested whether the number of solutions to a proposed policy that did 
or did not have a direct impact on participants would influence their current satisfaction. 
Diverse relative to limited future choices enhanced current satisfaction when they had 
relevance for participants; there was, however, only a tendency for the number of future 
choices to influence current satisfaction when the choices did not have relevance for 
participants. Experiment 2 further explored the influence of choice on satisfaction, tested 
potential underlying processes, and the influence of individual differences. Results 
showed that (1) people did not show a preference for diverse over limited relevant 
choices when the policy had a direct effect on them (relevant condition); (2) when the 
policy did not have a direct effect (nonrelevant condition), people did not show a 
preference for diverse over limited options; and (3) participants simulated a future 
alternative world when considering future choices.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Choice is a fundamental part of our lives; a quick trip to the supermarket confirms 
this—85 different varieties and brands of crackers; 285 varieties of cookies, with 21 
options for chocolate chips alone; 13 brands of sports drinks; 85 different juices; 75 iced 
teas, and on and on (Schwartz, 2004). In fact, the average American grocery store has 
been growing steadily for the past 30 years, with some stores exceeding the size of a 
football field and carrying upwards of 60,000 items (Fasolo, Hertwig, Huber, & Ludwig, 
2009). Choosing, however, is not solely a marketplace phenomenon; we make choices 
about dating, how to take care of ourselves, what to name our kids, and what job we wish 
to pursue for a living (Lenton, Fasolo, & Todd, 2008; McClure et al., 2004; Ogden, 
Daniells, & Barnett, 2009; Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002; Sauermann, 2005). Since 
choice is such a pervasive part of our lives, one would think that describing choice is as 
tantalizing as Loewenstein (1999) suggests—it would seem to contain something that one 
can‘t have too much of, like clean air or beauty.  
One conceptual way of understanding choice involves a consideration of the 
number of options in any given selection set—those options from which we have to 
choose (Chernev, 2003; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Inherent to choosing is an experiential 
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state—one that involves perceptions of personal control (Steiner, 1979) and carries 
profound emotional implications (Anderson, 2003). Choices shape our affective and 
motivational states by allowing us to perceive control of a situation. Yet different 
theoretical perspectives have conflicting interpretations about choosing; some extol 
choice (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985), while others carry a less exuberant portrayal (e.g., 
Burger, 1989). How can choice feel good sometimes, yet aversive in other 
circumstances? 
Part of determining how one feels about choice involves a comparison of 
alternatives. Prior research has explored how options make us feel about our decisions 
(Chernev, 2003; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000); how we feel when we reflect back on 
decisions we have made in the past (Brehm, 1956; Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 2007); and 
how much confidence we have about future decisions (Knox & Inkster, 1968).  In this 
paper, however, I examine how decision contexts containing different numbers of choices 
(limited versus diverse) influence our evaluation of our current circumstances. 
Specifically, I am interested in how the number of options that we have to consider for 
our future makes us feel about what we have available now. Situations that are relevant, 
furthermore, will have a different affective impact than those situations that are not 
personally relevant. This paper will contain a review of the relevant literature on choice 
and satisfaction, as well as offer a theoretical prediction about how the two interface; I 
will describe two experiments that show how our future choices impact our current 
perceptions of satisfaction, propose the decision determinants responsible for this effect, 
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and consider two personality types that should differentially affect how we process our 
choices. 
Understanding Choice 
Choice as a construct is beginning to capture more attention (Iyengar, 2010). 
Early work considered motivational aspects about how choice lends perceptions of 
personal control (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985; Langer, 1975; Perlmuter & Monty, 1979), or 
circumstances when we feel little or no choice, and consequently, perceive little personal 
control (Brehm, 1966; Peterson & Seligman, 1985). The commonality among these 
viewpoints was that choice tended to confer agency and personal control, and the lack of 
control felt from having diminished choices seems stifling and demotivating. 
Choice and Emotions 
Traditionally, psychologists and economists alike thought of choice from a 
consequentialist perspective that portrayed decisions as an evaluation of consequences to 
possible choice alternatives (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, &Welch, 2001). 
Consequentialist views of choice—considering only the cognitive aspects of choice—
ignore the emotional impact of decision-making. Gradually, psychologists came to 
understand that decision-making involves emotions, whereas economics held steadfast to 
views of rational choice. Simon (1956) summarized the distinction between the two 
disciplines: 
 
     A comparative examination of the models of adaptive behavior employed in    
     psychology (e.g., learning theories), and of the models of rational  
     behavior employed in economics, shows that in almost all respects the latter postulate     
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     a much greater complexity in the choice mechanisms, and a much larger capacity in    
     the organism for obtaining information and performing computations, than do the   
     former. Moreover, in the limited range of situations where the predictions of the two  
     theories have been compared…, the learning theories appear to account for the  
     observed behavior rather better than do the theories of rational behavior. (p. 129) 
 
 
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the emotions produced by 
choice (Mellers, 2000). Contrary to the notion that people assess the desirability and 
likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and can integrate that into 
decision-making, we perceive the emotional implications in our decisions (Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). In order to solve problems, choices can involve difficult-
to-reverse commitments that sometimes prove contrary to short-term self-interests. 
Emotions, thus, set boundaries for proper social behavior and appeal to acting in a 
manner that satisfies one‘s needs while contemplating the needs of others. Not only do 
we experience immediate emotions while making choices, we anticipate how we will feel 
about future consequences. 
Decision-making studies have considered various implications of choosing. 
Complex and unknown choices can lead to avoidance, delay, and fatigue (Ariely, 2000; 
Benartzi & Thaler, 2002; Thompson, Hamilton, & Rust, 2005). Ariely (2000) has 
explored preferences for how people begin to make sense of unfamiliar options; he 
showed that consumers have a preference for more narrow options until they are familiar 
with the product being purchased. A number of researchers propose that making choices 
involves trade-offs and inherent opportunity costs for the options not chosen 
(Loewenstein & Elster (1992), Montague (2006), Luce, Bettman, & Payne (2001), and 
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Luce, Payne, & Bettman (1999)). Schwartz (2000) suggests, furthermore, that choices 
confer responsibility—we feel indebted to make the right decision when ample options 
arise. Researchers are also beginning to pursue a better understanding of the decision-
making strategies people rely on when choices are complex (Payne, 1982; Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993; Timmermans, 1993; Wright, 1975). 
Timing of Choices 
Theoretically, choices can have qualitatively different intrapersonal implications. 
While many studies contemplate consumer decisions that have relatively short-time 
horizons (Ariely, 2000; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), other choices can have long-term 
implications, such as making achievement-related choices (Eccles, 2005), setting goals 
for the future (Brunstein, 1993; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 
2001), selecting a potential mate (Lenton, Fasolo, & Todd, 2008), picking a vocation 
(Sauermann, 2005), or choosing the appropriate medical intervention (Ogden, Daniells, & 
Barnett, 2009). Time, itself, must be factored in decisions when we consider whether to 
―rise late or rise early, munch snacks or eat a healthy lunch, buy a snazzy sports car or the 
reliable sedan, get a job or go to college, risk pregnancy or use a contraceptive‖ 
(Loewenstein & Elster, 1992). 
The idea that our future can influence how we perceive our current circumstances 
is not an entirely new concept. Khan and Dhar (2007) showed that many of our choices 
involve conflicts of self-control over vice or virtue. So, for example, whether we engage 
in a low- or high-brow movie or magazine or eat a healthy or unhealthy snack can be 
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influenced by future sequential options for choosing. When we feel we can choose 
something virtuous in the future, we are much more likely to consume a vice with the 
expectation of being better ―next time‖. This suggests that our choices are not viewed in 
isolation, and we frame our choices with a broader perspective about how choices will 
occur in the future. I propose that choices need not even be intertemporal or sequential—
but that simply thinking about our future choices has an effect on determining what we 
do and feel right now.   
Influence of Culture and Context on Choosing 
Our choices can also be strongly influenced by our culture and context. Triandis 
(1989) suggests that Westerners are more likely to be individualistic, and therefore, give 
more priority to personal goals over the goals of collectives. Eastern cultures, by contrast, 
tend to be more collectivistic and either make no distinctions between personal and 
collective goals, or if such distinctions are made, tend to subordinate their personal goals 
to the collective goals. This view is consistent with Markus and Kitayama‘s (2003) 
disjoint and conjoint models that distinguish preferences for agency between North 
American and Asian cultures. North American cultures are saturated with the promotion 
of choice and opportunity, and relative to Asian cultures, North Americans tend to choose 
based on their preferences and are more motivated to express their preferences in their 
choices. 
In support of these models, Iyengar and Lepper (1999) found that Anglo-
American children showed more motivation and a greater preference for making their 
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own choices, whereas Asian-American children showed higher motivation and a 
preference for choices to be made for them by trusted authority figures. Thus, this 
suggests that the culture that we are raised in, in and of itself, can determine how we view 
the importance of making personal choices and demonstrating preferences in the 
promotion of agency. Iyengar and DeVoe (2003) suggested that even the Asian cultures 
reported having much less freedom of choice—above and beyond the effects of 
socioeconomic status, household status, age, and gender. This suggests that North 
Americans, relative to Eastern cultures, want and need perceptually more choices. Our 
pursuit and desire for the expression of choice is thus malleable and open to cultural 
influence. 
Cultural messages that promote the benefits of a consumer product can even have 
an influence over some of the decisions that we make. Montague and colleagues 
(McClure et al., 2004) propose that social, cognitive, and cultural influences coalesce to 
produce behavioral preferences for what we eat and drink. In a behavioral and brain 
imaging study, researchers delivered Coca-Cola or Pepsi to participants during an event-
related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to probe for neural correlates of 
behavioral preferences. These drinks were chosen because of their nearly identical 
chemical compositions and their cultural familiarity. In the absence of brand information, 
subjects were equally split in their taste preferences, thus demonstrating virtually 
indistinguishable differences between drinks. In semi-blind taste tests, however, 
participants preferred the Coke in the labeled cups significantly more than the Coke in the 
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blind task and significantly more than Pepsi in the parallel semi-blind task. Coke, it 
appears, has captured the hearts of many through cultural messages despite the fact that 
people have a difficult time differentiating the taste between the two brands. Powerful 
messages disseminated in brand management and advertising have thus distinguished 
these choices from one another. 
Personality and Choice 
 Individual differences exist in how we perceive choices. While it is clear that 
choice carries many benefits to the chooser, maximizers—those who carefully examine 
all options to seek the most optimal—can be overwhelmed with many choices (Simon, 
1956; Schwartz, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2002). Satisficiers, by contrast, are more likely to 
pick an option that simply crosses the threshold of acceptability. Relative to satisficiers, 
maximizers are more likely to experience regret and depression, are less happy and less 
optimistic, and tend to have lower scores in overall life satisfaction. Maximizing 
behaviors are highly correlated with perfectionism, social comparison, counter-factual 
thinking, and slower decision-making. When maximizers and satisficiers leave college 
and enter the job market, although maximizers tend to secure jobs with salaries 
approximately 20% higher, they tend to experience lower satisfaction and more negative 
affect during the search process (Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006). 
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The Number of Options 
Perceiving choice involves having at least two evaluative options to consider 
(Steiner, 1979). Beyond two options, a decision context impacts how we feel and how 
motivated we are (Ariely, 2000; Chernev, 2003; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Thompson, 
Hamilton, & Rust, 2005). Too few options does not allow for perceptions of personal 
control and choice (Steiner, 1979); yet, too many choices can feel burdensome and 
overwhelming (Schwartz, 2000; Mick, Broniarczyk, & Haidt, 2004). Several independent 
lines of research suggest that choice is positive. More options can lead to a general sense 
of increased motivation and personal control (Perlmuter & Monty, 1977).  Brigham 
(1979), for example, found that participants who were given the option to choose their 
own consequences in the classroom tended to work harder and faster, and responded 
more favorably to the situation as opposed to when they were unable to make such 
choices.  
From a consumer perspective, choice confers the benefit of satisfying people‘s 
varied tastes. It also promotes competition among providers of goods and services while 
promoting lowered prices and improved quality (Loewenstein, 1999). Loewenstein 
suggests that variety is particularly good for people with highly differentiated tastes—so 
called ―experts‖—whose needs and wants are more satisfied by plenty. To the extent that 
we are familiar with what we are shopping for, abundant choice is beneficial. 
 Choice is also associated with greater intrinsic motivation, task performance, life 
skills, and higher outcome evaluation (Botti & Iyengar, 2006; Deci & Ryan, 1985; 
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Taylor, 1989). In health care, choice has been found to be associated with improvement 
in patient outcomes, satisfaction, adherence to medical recommendations, and patient 
health status (Ogden, Daniells, & Barnett, 2009). Choice is suggested to improve 
autonomous motivation and promotes flexibility, creativity, and increased capacity for 
complexity (Amabile, 1983).  
Unlimited choice has been shown to result in perceptions of autonomy, 
persistence (Deci & Ryan, 1987; Ryan & Deci, 2006), goal congruence, and a high state 
of well-being (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998; Sheldon, 2001). From a learning perspective, 
freedom of choice is additionally associated with curiosity and the acquisition of diverse 
adaptive strategies and competencies (Piaget, 1971). Heckhausen (1995) has even gone 
so far as to propose that diversity provides the ―raw material‖ upon which unprecedented 
developmental advancements and adaptations are made. Not surprisingly, having little or 
no choice is related to lower perceptions of personal control (Burger, 1989), increased 
levels of depression (Seligman, 1975), having negative adjustment to old age (Langer & 
Rodin, 1976), coping poorly with terminal illness (Taylor, 1983), and feeling reductions 
in motivation and achievement (Deci & Ryan, 1985).  
More recent evidence, however, suggests that although having many choices is 
often desirable, more options might not always be better, especially in a decision-making 
context. Relevant to the issue of number, studies show that decision-making related to 
choice, in and of itself, can produce many challenges, including confusion over options 
(cf. Ariely, 2000; Thompson, Hamilton, & Rust, 2005), regret following uncertainty in 
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decision-making (Bell, 1981; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), preemptive emotions such as 
anticipated regret and self-blame for making the wrong selection (Beattie, Baron, 
Hershey, & Spranca, 1994), decreased self-esteem, higher anxiety and hostility (Burger, 
Brown, & Allen, 1983), anticipatory counterfactuals or ―prefactuals‖ (Anderson, 2003), 
and a heightened sense of accountability to make the right choice with one‘s diverse array 
of options (Schwartz, 2000).  
Testing the Number of Options 
The availability of choices can also influence the likelihood of choosing. In a 
series of field, class, and laboratory experiments, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found that 
despite being more attracted to contexts containing extensive choices, people are much 
more likely to commit to making a selection with limited versus extensive options. They 
also found evidence that the quality of performance was greater with limited options; 
people experienced less regret, and felt greater satisfaction with their selected choice 
when they had fewer initial options. Thus, although people report having lots of choices 
as desirable, too many choices can have significant detrimental consequences on 
motivation—an effect known as the choice overload hypothesis.  
Chernev (2003) reported results consistent with this view; participants who were 
exposed to a large set of options had more difficulty making a decision and felt less 
confident about their decisions than those exposed to a relatively small set. Although it is 
obvious that there are some downsides to making decisions involving a large number of 
choices, it is also clear that people find decision contexts having many choices more 
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attractive than those having just a few (e.g, Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2000, 
2004). Perhaps this is because a large selection-set is especially likely to contain a 
desirable solution, allows variety-seeking, engenders perceptions of freedom and control, 
and is more likely to represent the total number of possible options available (e.g., 
Chernev, 2003). 
The idea of an ‗information overload‘ is not new. Processing too many choices 
provides too much information at a given time, and thus, leads to poorer decisions and 
dysfunctional performance (Malhotra, 1982). Limited processing capacity has been 
explored by different models of memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Craik & Lockart, 
1972; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Bettman, 1979). Furthermore, a preference for smaller 
chunks of information comes from the notion of limited capacity for short-term memory 
(Broadbent, 1975; Miller, 1956; Simon, 1974). These memory models serve as 
convergent models for choice. Information overload, suboptimal decision-making, and 
maladaptive feelings can also result when people are exposed to too many choices 
(Fasolo, McClelland, & Todd, 2007; Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974; Malhotra, 1982).  
The magic number of choices remains elusive, however. Although having no choice seem 
to subordinate freedom and autonomy, abundance of choices can be overwhelming and 
stifle adaptive decision-making. Haynes (2009) has suggested that the intermediate 
number of choices—3 to 10—seems to have the widest appeal, inhibiting frustration and 
regret from large set-sizes, while promoting satisfaction. While this may oversimplify 
choosing, clearly there are costs associated with very small and very large set-sizes. This 
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is consistent with Ariely‘s (2000) finding that people prefer limited options to consider 
when purchasing an unknown, complex consumer product. 
Satisfaction with Choice 
Satisfaction—when applied to choices—typically suggests how pleasant or 
enjoyable the options appear to the decision-maker (e.g., Botti & Iyengar, 2006; Iyengar 
& Lepper, 2000). Many theoretical models of satisfaction have traditionally seen it as a 
construct of interest related to performance and achievement (e.g., Hertzberg, Mausner, 
& Snyderman, 1959; Locke & Latham, 1990). The straightforward prediction has 
typically been the greater the success experienced, the greater satisfaction experienced. 
From the perspective of choice, satisfaction is likely an inverted U-shape function based 
on the number of alternatives—that is, satisfaction increases with choice as the set sizes 
increases up to a point, and then it begins to diminish as more choices are added. 
Reutskaja and Hogarth (2009), for example, found that both outcome and process 
satisfaction is highest with 10 options when participants were offered between 5 and 30 
options for a gift. 
Determining the satisfaction with one‘s choices involves comparisons and an 
appraisal of the advantages or disadvantages that the options will yield (Brenner, 
Rottenstreich, & Sood, 1999). Contrary to classical theories, the subjective value of 
options is not just a function of that option; rather it is a determination of the relevance of 
that option in relation to others and the self. In the absence of a referent group, it is 
conceivable that the referent becomes a hypothetical scenario of ―what-ifs‖—what if I get 
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better parking? What if I miss out on better parking? And what if someone has better 
parking than I do? 
Because performance and achievement are closely tied to competition, it makes 
intuitive sense that an appraisal of satisfaction comes from comparing to another referent 
group. As Michalos (1980) suggests, it isn‘t just having more income, it is having more 
income than someone else that makes one happy. This means that part of how we 
determine how satisfied we are with what we have is a function of the perceived 
difference between one‘s own status and that of a reference person or group. Yet, little is 
known about how our perceptions of satisfaction are influenced by choices that are 
forthcoming in the future. 
Alternative Worlds 
 Concerns for our future often pervade our thoughts; people have strong hopes and 
fears about what our options will look like in the future (Markus & Nurius, 1986). People 
evaluate their current reality, in part, by engaging in mental simulations of an alternative 
future world (e.g., Aspinwall, 1997; Markman & McMullen, 2003; Oettingen, 1996; 
Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001; Sanna, 2000; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; 
Taylor & Schneider, 1989; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), a process that involves 
imagining how things should turn out in the future. This might involve imagining the 
results of diet and exercise or wearing a cap and gown at graduation.  
 Mental simulations serve as guides for many purposes including problem-solving 
and emotion regulation—anticipating how we feel and managing our emotions (Taylor, 
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Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998). Visualizing a desired outcome and having positive 
expectations is related to improvements in weight loss, recovery from illness and trauma, 
and having romantic professional success (Oettingen, 1996). We also engage in mental 
imagery and imagine potential outcomes when we are concerned about problems 
(Aspinwall, 1997; Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001). Taylor and Schneider (1989) 
suggest that simulation enables us to prepare for changes in the future, interpret events 
that have already occurred, reinterpret emotional states and muster the energy to do what 
needs to get done; thus mental simulation acts as a segue between thought and action. 
Fantasy realization can assist in understanding desired outcomes and preventing negative 
aspects in people‘s ―problem spaces.‖ The negative reality that might be confronting us 
could stand in the way of obtaining a desirable future. The extent to which the problem 
appears solvable and a solution attainable will determine how the fantasy makes us feel 
about the situation. 
 These prefactual thoughts—thoughts about how things ―might be‖—have direct 
affective implications (Sanna, 1998). These thoughts and feelings are prefactual in that 
they are mentally simulated alternatives that occur prior to the actual outcome, therefore 
occurring before the actual ―act‖ happens. Sanna (2000) suggests that upward 
counterfactuals simulate better realities (e.g., ―If I had studied harder and made better 
grades, I would have had a better chance of getting into grad school‖); whereas 
downward counterfactuals simulate worse realities (e.g., ―At least I wasn‘t speeding even 
more, or that ticket I got would‘ve been even worse‖). Although unsupported by prior 
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tests, Sanna proposes that it is just as likely that prefactuals engage the same type of 
affective processes as counterfactuals. 
The affective evaluation of one‘s current state can be assimilated or contrasted to 
an alternative future world. On the one hand, if it is assimilated, the attractiveness of the 
current state will be positively related to the attractiveness of the alternative world. The 
more positive the alternative world appears, the more positive the current state. 
Assimilation typically occurs when individuals expect to attain outcomes that are more 
positive than those they are currently receiving (e.g., Markman & McMullen, 2003; 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Sanna, 2000).  Assimilations and contrasts, furthermore, are 
more likely to occur in contexts when decisions are personally relevant and meaningful. 
The number of options available interacts with the relevance of the topic being 
considered. For future choices that are closer temporally, the relevance of the topic 
becomes more meaningful and impactful. The number of options is important to 
determining the effect on current satisfaction. Number serves as a comparison referent. 
Diverse over limited choices should therefore stimulate mental simulations of an 
alternative world with the number of options to solve a problem. In turn, this simulation 
of an improved alternative reality elicits a positive feeling and this is assimilated with 
one‘s current state thus improving current satisfaction. 
The extent to which the future choices are personally meaningful and relevant will 
determine the valence of the future choices. Relevance can be determined from a 
meaningful choice and also from one in which the choices will be personally impactful 
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and forthcoming (e.g., positive and attainable). If the future choices are attainable and 
personally relevant, diverse over limited options should be positively perceived. Diverse 
choices allow for a variety of options to enhance preference options and a greater 
likelihood of other future selections. In contrast, when future choices are meaningful yet 
are not personally attainable and therefore not directly relevant, negative perceptions will 
follow (e.g., positive and unattainable). In this study, relevance will be manipulated by a 
topic for that invokes a sense of urgency and meaningfulness—campus parking.  
College campuses are often compressed for space and parking is usually an issue of high 
personal concern and relevance. So, for example, if a group of individuals drive their cars 
to school but parking is very limited, their current parking situation is not desirable. This 
problem would be less negative if one could imagine a quick and attainable solution 
resulting in ample parking spaces. In this situation, one‘s alternative and current worlds 
are positively correlated; the more positively they perceive their alternative worlds 
(ample parking), the less negatively they perceive their current one. 
 On the other hand, when individuals cannot attain the outcomes of a superior 
performance or better outcomes there are two possible outcomes; either people contrast 
their unattained outcomes with their current state and feel badly or they feel indifference 
(e.g., Markman & McMullen, 2003; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Sanna, 2000). Using 
campus parking, for example, might cause contrasts to occur when a solution will not 
impact the individual‘s current problem; a better world is too far off to positively 
influence one‘s own state of affairs. In this situation, their alternative is more positive 
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than their current state—but it is not attainable. Thus, the more positive their alternative 
world, the less positive (or more negative) is the perception of their current circumstance. 
Alternatively, indifference occurs when options are nonrelevant (e.g., too far off). 
Individuals may not care about the number of choices that others have. It is possible that 
perceptual contrasts would not occur because of the lack of salience with the issue being 
considered. Instead of negative affect from having been left out of an impactful choice, 
the reaction is more indifference. If indifference does occur, people who do not benefit 
from a future choice will not feel badly and therefore their current state of satisfaction 
remains unchanged. 
Choice and Alternative Worlds 
The number of choices available in a decision context may also serve as an 
alternative world. The more choices, the more attractive the decision context, and 
subsequently the more attractive the alternative world becomes. If choice serves this 
function, then a current problem may appear more positive when the decision context 
involves many versus a few options and whether these options as long as the options are 
personally relevant. Specifically, when the decision context provides solutions that will 
benefit the individuals currently experiencing a problem (e.g., parking, traffic 
congestion), assimilation should occur and the current problem will appear better (less 
negative) when there are many choices or solutions versus a few. 
With knowledge that a current problem involves choices and that one will 
personally benefit in the near future, assimilation should occur. Information about the self 
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becomes highly accessible and the judgment in question is pulled toward a comparison 
standard. Assimilating choices occurs when the options have direct relevance and will 
personally benefit the self. In this instance, more choices are better, and an imagined 
future seems tenable and close at-hand. The options for a better imagined-future-state 
will be perceptually assimilated with our current standing and pull up perceptions of 
satisfaction with what one has now. High relevance and diverse options would seem 
highly beneficial and would be assimilated with what we currently have, thus leading to 
enhanced accessibility of positive standard-consistent cognitions (e.g., I am lucky they 
are addressing the parking problem immediately; I should benefit from the solution). 
When the decision context, however, provides solutions that are not self-relevant—is not 
attainable and thus will not have personal benefit to individuals who are currently 
experiencing the problem—contrast will occur and the current situation should appear 
worse (more negative) when there are many solutions versus just a few. Alternatively, 
participants will not show an effect for the number of choices because of the lack of 
personal relevance. 
The Present Research 
Satisfaction with our current standing is enhanced by perceptions of gain relative 
to others when options are salient. The extent to which we perceive our options to exceed 
the desirability of others‘ options leads us to the highest level of satisfaction. This 
implicitly suggests that satisfaction involves a social process of comparing others‘ 
outcomes to one‘s own outcomes. Salience of others‘ options, from which one will not 
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personally benefit, will induce an imagined future that could have been different. This is 
known as an upward counterfactual; it should produce negative affect and a perceptual 
contrast that leads to a lower level of satisfaction with one‘s current standing to the extent 
that people compare and feel a sense of loss.  When the decision is likely to be personally 
relevant, one should desire to have many available options, whereas if the decision does 
not offer personal reward, the inverse is likely true. 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to show that the number of choices impact our 
current satisfaction; more specifically, when an option bears direct personal relevance, 
having many options is more desirable than having just a few. Thus, we should be more 
satisfied with our current state when we have many versus just a few choices. This should 
hold true unless the outcome has no relevance to us. When no personal benefit will be 
afforded by the options, then the effect of having many choices will either appear less 
positive as a result of the current state being contrasted to a future alternative state, or no 
difference will be found because the issue has no personal impact. Experiment 2 explores 
how this effect might occur. More specifically, measures probe the extent to which 
participants care about the number of options offered, the extent to which they imagine a 
future alternative world while considering choices, whether the policy would impact their 
current situation, the extent to which the future impacted their current feelings, and 
finally, their concern about parking for themselves, their friends, and people they do not 
know. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1: METHOD 
 
 
Participants. A total of 82 students—67 women, 15 men—enrolled in General 
Psychology at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro participated and received 
credit toward a research option. 
Materials. A booklet of survey materials was provided explaining a campus 
parking problem, potential solutions, and measures of satisfaction. This scenario asked 
students to give university campus officials feedback on how to handle a campus parking 
shortage. In one scenario, the university suggested that the solution to the parking 
problem would be implemented at the end of this academic year (relevant condition); in 
the other condition, the solution to the parking problem would not be implemented for ten 
academic years (nonrelevant condition). Additionally, participants were given either two 
options from which to choose a solution (limited choices condition) or ten options 
(diverse choices condition) from which to choose a solution. Experiment 1 used a 2 x 2 
design (relevant or nonrelevant x limited or diverse choices) whereby participants were 
randomly assigned to a condition. 
Design and Procedure. Participants were run in groups of up to 10 in a 
laboratory with individual desks. Following the informed consent, instructions were 
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given by the experimenter to carefully read the survey booklet presenting a university 
problem, and to select an option that seemed most viable for addressing the concern. In 
each session, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 
Solutions to Parking. Following an overview of the historical parking shortage 
on campus along with information on increasing enrollment, participants were provided 
with either two (limited choices condition) or ten (diverse choices condition) options to 
solve the problem. They were asked to evaluate each of the choices and to select the best 
solution by circling the option that appeared the most desirable. A yoked-design was 
employed whereby participants in the limited (2) choices condition received one of five 
different versions of the questions used in the diverse (10) choices condition to prevent 
preferences to any particular set of questions. To control for the difference in time 
required to scrutinize the options in the two versus ten option conditions, participants in 
the limited (2) choices conditions were provided ten anagrams to solve at the end of the 
stimuli. The anagrams contained five-letter words that were pre-tested and found to be 
both frequent in the English language as well as easy to solve (Martin & Manning, 1995), 
thus merely acting as a time filler. 
Measures of Attitudes Toward Parking. Consistent with prior findings on 
previous constructs, a single-item measure of satisfaction is just as effective as multi-item 
measures of satisfaction (Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). A measure of satisfaction, 
therefore, was asked using an 11-point scale. Participants were asked to respond to how 
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satisfied they were with the current parking situation (not at all satisfied to neutral to 
very satisfied). 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 1: RESULTS 
 
 
An analysis of variance was conducted to evaluate the relationship between 
satisfaction with the current standing and the relevance and number of options presented.  
The independent variables—relevance and number—contained two-levels each. The 
solutions that were presented were to be implemented the following academic year 
(relevant) or in ten years (nonrelevant). The solutions that were presented either 
contained limited (two) or diverse (ten) options. The dependent variable was a self-report 
of satisfaction with one‘s current parking as it stands now.  
The results for the ANOVA indicated a nonsignificant effect for options, F(1, 78) 
= .13, p < .72, as well as a nonsignificant effect for relevance, F(1, 78) = .208, p < .65. 
Figure 1 shows, however, a significant interaction between options and relevance, F(1, 
78) = 5.26, p < .025.  As may be seen from Table 1, participants‘ ratings of current 
satisfaction within the relevant conditions were higher when they had 10 versus 2 
options, F(1, 78) = 3.52, p < .06. In contrast, an opposite but nonsignificant pattern of 
results was obtained within the nonrelevant conditions: the ratings of current satisfaction 
of these participants were less positive when they had diverse versus limited options, F(1, 
78) = 1.87, p < .18. Although neither of the specific contrasts within relevance and non-
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relevance conditions proved to be statistically significant, the specific pattern of the 
statistically significant option x relevance interaction supports the view that people are 
more satisfied with many versus just a few options when they could benefit from the 
available options, but they were somewhat less satisfied with many versus a few when 
the options would not provide them personal benefit. 
1 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT 1: DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Experiment 1 suggests that satisfaction with one‘s current standing is influenced 
by the number of choices offered to solve a future problem and whether or not the 
solutions bear personal relevance. When options were personally relevant, the current 
situation was assimilated with an imagined-future-state and current satisfaction had a 
positive relationship with diverse choices; there was a marginally significant difference 
between diverse and limited options.  Participants, therefore, felt the best about what they 
had currently when an issue of personal relevance had diverse options for change in the 
near future. However, when participants were asked to make decisions about choices that 
carried no direct relevance, there was no evidence found for perceptual contrast. It was 
expected that the ratings of current satisfaction would transverse and people would rate 
their current satisfaction higher with limited relative to diverse options; but because the 
effect was left unsupported, it is unclear if there was insufficient power to support the 
contrasts or if people remained relatively unaffected because the issue did not affect them 
personally.  
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT 2: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Experiment 2 was designed to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1. 
This study serves three goals: (1) to replicate the relevance x options interactions; (2) to 
explore whether mental simulations are driving this effect; and finally, (3) to explore 
individual differences that might potentially amplify or attenuate this effect when 
considering how our future choices impact our current situation. 
The first goal of Experiment 2 was to increase the sample size in an effort to 
strengthen the pattern of findings obtained in Experiment 1. In this experiment, results 
supported assimilation of options in the relevance condition, but there was insufficient 
support of contrast in the non-relevant condition. In order to determine the appropriate 
sample size, a power analysis was conducted using Gpower 2.0. Based on the difference 
between the means in the nonrelevant condition in Experiment 1, in order to have an 80% 
chance of detecting a difference of a 1.1 or greater with a one-tailed analysis at the α = 
.05 level , a sample of 174 participants would need to be collected. 
Participants were presented with the same stimuli as in Experiment 1, with a few 
additions. Once again, participants were given a booklet that contained information about 
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a campus parking problem. The design was randomly assigned to condition in a 2 choices 
(limited vs. diverse) x 2 relevance (relevant vs. nonrelevant) between-subjects design.  
In addition to considering how participants perceived the problem relative to its timing 
and the number of options they have to solve the problem, three questions addressed how 
participants perceived their situation relative to others‘. Participants were asked the extent 
to which they cared about the parking for their friends, how much they cared about 
improved parking for themselves, and how much they cared about the parking situation 
for students they do not know. These questions explored the extent to which the needs of 
others might be factored in to their overall perception of parking needs relative to their 
own. 
  Although most people strive for rewards that exceed comparison targets, it is 
quite plausible that people high in collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1989) —a high 
preference for the benefit of the group over the individual—can also appreciate ingroup 
members benefiting when they personally receive little or no benefit. Individualists are 
more likely to demonstrate personal goals over ingroup goals; by contrast, collectivists 
are much more likely to define themselves based on ingroup terms and regulate their 
behavior based on ingroup norms (Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). Collectivists, by 
nature, are more likely to seek interdependence and ingroup harmony. Therefore, choices 
available to ingroup members should invoke different feelings for someone with 
collectivist tendencies versus someone who is individualistic in nature; more specifically, 
people who are individualistic in nature should prefer better parking for themselves 
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relative to others. And although people who are collectivistic in nature may also want 
better parking, it is conceivable that they would feel less negative affect as a result of 
ingroup members (e.g., future UNCG students) receiving better parking relative to 
themselves. It is possible that the predicted contrasts that did not receive sufficient 
support in the non-relevant condition might be found for participants who are high in a 
given trait such as collectivism. Collectivistic people might compare their current 
situation to a greater extent, and therefore display greater differences in current 
satisfaction, relative to those who are low in collectivism. 
This heightened desire for benefits to the ingroup (e.g., future UNCG students) 
would thus attenuate the disappointment and dissatisfaction of the gains of others from 
which one will not personally benefit.  High collectives might envision a future where 
ingroup members are benefiting when they themselves are not and consequently feel less 
disappointment or loss; therefore, the contrasts should have less effect on current 
satisfaction. Conversely, low collectives (high individualists) should perceive a loss 
relative to others when the better parking is available to those in the future; contrasts 
should therefore have a stronger effect on current satisfaction.  
 One alternative possibility, however, is that high collectivists relative to low 
collectivists will behave differently than expected when presented with options for others. 
This elevated concern for parking for others, a characteristic inherent to collectivists, may 
also lead them to be more aware of what others have (or will receive) relative to 
themselves. It is, therefore, also possible that collectivists will be negatively impacted 
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when they won‘t receive benefits that other receive because they are even more aware of 
what is happening in the future for others. Thus, in the nonrelevant condition, high 
collectives may be especially dissatisfied when they have diverse versus limited options. 
One additional goal of Experiment 2 is to test whether participants engaged in 
mental imagery and how they perceived the problem and the potential solutions provided. 
Following presentation of the stimuli, participants were asked to respond to questions 
designed to measure satisfaction and the determinants of their decision. The questions 
explore how people think about choices that are relevant or nonrelevant and how that 
impacts perceptions of what they currently have. More specifically, they were asked how 
they perceived the number of solutions presented, the extent to which they engaged in 
mental imagery, the extent to which the future policy would impact their current parking, 
the extent to which the policy would have a personal impact, and finally, whether or not 
focusing on how the future might change influences what they felt about what they have 
now.  
In addition to a conceptual replication of the interaction in Experiment 1, there is 
evidence that individual differences exist in the amount of effortful thinking we like to 
engage in. Therefore, even though the task does not involve much cognitive effort, it is 
possible that those who are less apt to engage in effortful thinking—low need for 
cognition or NFC—may not be especially likely to be influenced by mental simulations 
and personal relevance (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Those higher in need 
for cognition (NFC)—those thinking more carefully about their options—may be much 
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more likely to have their current appraisals of satisfaction influenced by what will occur 
because of considering the implications of the options carefully.  
It is possible, therefore, that when engaging in prefactuals related to future 
options, individuals who score high in NFC will be more likely to carefully consider the 
implications of problems and their solutions. It is possible that people high in NFC 
therefore assimilate (in the relevant condition) or contrast (in the nonrelevant condition) 
choices to a greater extent relative to participants low in NFC because they think more in 
depth about the decision determinants and their implications. This might help account for 
the unattained transversal in the nonrelevant choices in Experiment 1. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENT 2: METHOD 
 
 
Participants.   A total of 200 students—155 women, 45 men—enrolled in 
General Psychology and Developmental Psychology at the University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro participated and received credit toward a research option. 
Materials. A booklet of survey materials proposed evaluating a campus parking 
problem as it appeared in Experiment 1. After reading about the issue, participants were 
once again presented with the same options as the participants in Experiment 1. The 
participants were randomly assigned to either limited (2) or diverse (10) choices and at 
the end of this academic year (relevant) or in ten academic years (nonrelevant) 
conditions. After selecting the best possible solution to alleviate the parking problem, 
participants completed measures of satisfaction with their current situation, appraisals 
associated with their decision of satisfaction, and measures of individual differences.  
Design and Procedure. Participants were run in groups of up to 10 at a time in a 
laboratory with individual desks. Following the informed consent, instructions were 
given by the experimenter to carefully read the survey booklet presenting a university 
problem and to provide their opinion about the best potential solution. In each session, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 
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Solutions to Parking. Following an overview of the historical parking shortage 
on campus along with increasing enrollment, participants were provided with either two 
(limited choices condition) or ten (diverse choices condition) options with which the 
problem can be solved. To control for the difference in time required to scrutinize the 
options, participants in the limited (2) choices conditions were given ten anagrams at the 
end of the stimuli to solve. The anagrams contained five-letter words pre-tested and 
found to be both frequent in the English language as well as easy to solve (Martin & 
Manning, 1995). Participants in the limited (2) choices condition received one of five 
combinations from the diverse (10) choices condition to control for preferences to any 
particular set of solutions. 
Measures of Attitudes Toward Parking. A measure of current satisfaction was 
asked using an 11-point Likert scale. Participants were asked to respond to how satisfied 
they were with the current parking situation (not at all satisfied to neutral to very 
satisfied). To rule out potential measurement error from using one question to tap 
satisfaction, an additional set of questions were posed using a semantic differential. 
Semantic differential is a widely used measurement of attitudes using bipolar adjective 
pairs. Five pairs were constructed and have been proven to yield highly reliable findings 
which tend to correlate highly with the construct of interest (Osgood, Suci, & 
Tannenbaum, 1957). Participants were asked to rate the current parking situation by 
circling a number that most closely resembled how they felt about parking now. 
Questions that were designed to further explore satisfaction were asked on a 7-point 
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bipolar semantic differential (good to bad; pleasant to unpleasant; acceptable to 
unacceptable; fair to unfair; excellent to poor). 
Measures of Satisfaction Determinants. In order to explore the appraisals 
associated with current satisfaction, the participants were asked questions regarding their 
decision-making. Each of the questions was posed using an 11-point scale. The following 
questions were asked as follows: 
Number of Options. “You were presented with a number of solutions for 
parking. Based on the number of options presented to you, how good do you think the 
policy will be?‖ (1 = not at all good to 6 = neutral to 11 = very good). 
Future Simulations. ―When you were thinking about the parking issue, did you 
imagine how the parking might look in the future at UNCG?‖ (1 = not at all to 6 = 
neutral to 11 = a lot). 
Current Impact. ―You were given information about when the parking solution 
is going to be implemented by the university. Will the change in the parking policy 
impact your ability to park now?‖ (1 = no impact at all to 6 = neutral to 11 = big impact). 
Ability. ―When you thought about the change in the parking policy, did you think 
about whether the parking policy would or wouldn‘t impact your ability to park?‖ (1 = 
did not think at all about the impact  to 6 = neutral to 11 = thought a lot about the 
impact). 
Future Impact on Current Standing. ―Sometimes, our view of things in the 
present is affected by our knowledge that things will be different in the future. To what 
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extent are your current feelings about parking affected by your ideas about what parking 
may be like in the future?‖ (1 = not at all affected to 6 = neutral to 11 = very affected). 
An additional set of questions were posed to tap feelings of parking relative to self versus 
others. Each of these questions were asked on an 11-point scale (from 1 = don’t care at 
all to 6 = neutral to 11 = care a lot). 
Friends. ―How much do you care about how the parking situation affects your 
friends?‖ 
Self.  ―How much do you care about getting better parking?” 
Unknown Others. ―How much do you care about how the parking situation 
affects UNCG students you don‘t know?‖   
Measure of Collectivism. The Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) was 
administered (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).  
Measure of Thinking. The Need for Cognition Scale was administered 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). 
Analysis Strategy. The questions regarding simulations were coded and scored to 
explore the decision-making determinants. As with Experiment 1, satisfaction with the 
current standing was compared using a traditional 2 relevance (relevant or nonrelevant) x 
2 choices (limited or diverse) ANOVA. The personality measure of need for cognition, 
collectivism, and the self-report measures of collectivism were aggregated and analyzed 
as predictors along with options and relevance. Current satisfaction was the criterion 
variable of interest.  
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CHAPTER VII 
EXPERIMENT 2: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
Measures of Satisfaction. To determine the relationship between the two 
different types of measures of satisfaction, correlation coefficients were computed among 
the single scale measure of satisfaction and the aggregated five-item semantic differential 
(good to bad; pleasant to unpleasant; acceptable to unacceptable; fair to unfair; 
excellent to poor). The correlation between the single item and the aggregated semantic 
differential was significant, r(171) = .81, p = .01. To verify the stability of the five-item 
semantic differential, a maximum likelihood factor analysis was conducted. Two criteria 
were used to determine the number of factors: the a priori hypothesis that the measure 
was unidimensional and the interpretability of the factor solution. A principle 
components analysis yielded one factor that accounted for 81% of the variance. The 
second factor had an eigenvalue below one, and therefore, the results were considered a 
one-factor solution. To determine the reliability and consistency of the five items, a 
Chronbach‘s alpha showed that the five items had high internal consistency, r = .942, p < 
.0001. 
First, an analysis of variance was conducted to evaluate the relationship between 
the aggregated score of satisfaction (an average of the five bipolar ratings) with current 
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standing from the semantic differential along with relevance and number of options 
presented.  The independent variables—relevance and number—contained two-levels 
each (relevance versus nonrelevance; limited versus diverse choices). The dependent 
variable was an aggregated score of self-reported satisfaction with one‘s current standing 
using the semantic differential.  
The results for the ANOVA indicated a nonsignificant effect for options, F(1, 
167) = .474, p = .492. There was a nonsignificant effect for relevance, F(1, 167) = 1.656, 
p < .20. Finally, there was also a nonsignificant interaction between options and 
relevance, F(1, 167) = .056, p = .813. It is possible that despite the high correlation 
between the aggregated semantic differential and the single item question related to 
satisfaction that they tapped somewhat different but overlapping conceptual ideas. So, for 
example, although good, pleasant, and acceptable might have strong conceptual 
similarities to satisfaction, the questions asking about excellent and fair might tap other 
non-satisfaction related positive attributes. It is also possible that these attributes 
concentrate more on how participants are feeling at the moment, and therefore, are less of 
a global overall measure of satisfaction. The remaining analyses will concentrate on the 
single item measure of satisfaction, and therefore, explore a conceptual replication of 
Experiment 1. 
An analysis of variance was conducted to evaluate the relationship between 
satisfaction with the current standing (single item measure) and the relevance and number 
of options presented.  The independent variables—relevance and number—contained 
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two-levels each (relevant versus nonrelevant; diverse versus limited choices). The 
dependent variable was a self-report of satisfaction with one‘s current standing. The 
results for the ANOVA indicated a nonsignificant effect for options, F(1, 196) = .05, p = 
.824 (See table 2 for means). There was, however, a marginally significant effect for 
relevance, F(1, 196) = 3.79, p < .053 whereby participants had a higher current rating of 
satisfaction for relevant over nonrelevant solutions. There was a nonsignificant 
interaction between options and relevance, F(1, 196) = .195, p = .659.  Closer inspection 
of the data, however, revealed that some participants failed to observe the relevance 
manipulation. It is possible that despite random assignment to relevant or nonrelevant 
conditions, participants may have perceived the conditions differently in terms of their 
own personal relevance.  
This possibility is supported by the manipulation check that was embedded within 
the self-report measures of decision-determinants, revealing whether participants 
carefully read whether the solution to parking was to be implemented at the end of the 
academic year (relevant) or in 10 academic years (nonrelevant). Specifically the question 
measured the extent to which participants considered if the parking policy would or 
would not impact their ability to park. Some participants in the nonrelevant condition 
reported that there would be an impact on their ability to park, despite the fact that the 
policy would not be instituted for another 10 years. Likewise, some participants in the 
relevant condition reported that they had not thought at all about the impact on their 
ability to park. 
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Because some participants reported the impact of the policy discordantly from 
their assigned relevance, it is conceivable that these participants either misunderstood the 
timing of the policy or perceived their personal relevance different from their assigned 
condition; they were, therefore, dropped from the analysis. The cut-off criterion for 
dropping the participants was based on the neutral score of the scale. If participants who 
were assigned to the relevant condition rated the policy‘s impact 5 or lower (no impact at 
all) and if participants who were assigned to the nonrelevant condition rated the policy as 
having an impact 7 or greater (big impact), they were dropped from the analysis. Thirty-
eight participants who rated the impact a five or lower on the 11-point scale (No impact 
at all) were dropped from the analysis. Thirteen participants, additionally, who rated the 
impact at a 7 or higher on the 11-point scale (Big impact) were dropped from the 
analysis.  
By dropping participants who misreported their personal relevance in the 
manipulation check discrepantly from their assignment of relevance should allow for an 
analysis that will more closely mimic the naturally occurring situation. For some 
participants, despite being informed when the policy would be put into effect (e.g., at the 
end of this year or in ten years), may have perceptually considered their own personal 
relevance differently. It is also possible that participants misread or misunderstood the 
timing of the implementation of the policy. If this were the case, they would misinterpret 
the personal relevance of the parking policy as timing was manipulated to make the 
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parking policy change either relevant (implemented this academic year) or nonrelevant 
(implemented in ten years). 
A 2 x 2 analysis of variance was conducted to evaluate the relationship between 
satisfaction with the current standing, the assigned relevance and the number of options 
presented to solve the campus parking problem.  The independent variables—relevance 
and number—contained two-levels each. The solutions that were presented were to be 
implemented the following academic year (relevant) or in ten years (nonrelevant). The 
solutions that were presented either contained limited (two) or diverse (ten) options. The 
dependent variable was a self-report of satisfaction with one‘s current standing.  
The results for the ANOVA indicated a nonsignificant effect for options, F(1, 145) = 
.331, p = .556, and relevance, F(1, 145) = 2.073, p < 1.963. There was, additionally, a 
nonsignificant interaction between options, relevance, and campus parking, F(1, 145) = 
.27, p < .604. Table 3 displays the tables of means. The results showed only a modest 
tendency for higher current satisfaction in the relevant condition, however the effect was 
nonsignificant. The anticipated higher current satisfaction anticipated for diverse options 
in the relevant condition and the higher current satisfaction resulting from limited options 
in the nonrelevant condition were unsupported.  
I tested the specific interaction prediction that participants would be more 
satisfied with diverse (ten) versus limited (two) options in the relevant condition, but less 
satisfied with diverse (ten) versus limited (two) options in the nonrelevant condition. This 
analysis compares the differences in the mean rating participants having diverse (M = 
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5.47) versus limited (M = 5.04) options in the relevant condition to the difference in the 
mean rating of participants having diverse (M = 4.71) versus limited (M = 4.69) options 
in the nonrelevant condition.  This difference was nonsignificant, F(1, 145) = .567, p = 
.4527. As may be seen from Table 3, there was only a hint of higher current ratings in 
relevant conditions. There was, however, not the anticipated higher rating of current 
satisfaction in parking when there were diverse versus limited solutions to the parking 
problem when they were relevant (e.g., instituted at the end of the year), F(1, 145) = .51, 
p = .47. Additionally, there not the predicted higher rating for limited compared to 
diverse solutions to the parking problem when they were nonrelevant (e.g., instituted in 
ten years), F(1, 145) = .002, p < .96.  
In addition to self-reported relevance, participants were asked if they parked a car 
on campus. People who park on campus should theoretically have more of a vested 
interest in the campus parking policies relative to students who never park on campus. It 
is therefore conceivable that the participants who report parking on campus have the 
highest degree of personal relevance, and are therefore much more likely to care about 
the policies to improve parking. Because of the possibility that some participants might 
have a higher level of personal relevance, the following analysis concentrates on testing 
the options x relevance interaction solely for people who park on campus. Campus 
parking, therefore, was added as a predictor along with options (diverse vs. limited) and 
relevance (relevant vs. nonrelevant) and current satisfaction with parking as the outcome 
measure.  
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The results for the ANOVA indicated a nonsignificant effect for options, F(1, 70) 
= .86, p = .357, and relevance, F(1, 70) = 2.722, p < .103. There was, additionally, a 
nonsignificant interaction between options, relevance, F(1, 70) = .27, p < .276. Table 4 
displays the tables of means. The results showed only a modest tendency for higher 
current satisfaction in the relevant condition, however the effect was nonsignificant, F(1, 
70) = 1.81, p = .1825. There was also a very modest anticipated higher current 
satisfaction in the limited over diverse options in the nonrelevant condition, although the 
difference was not statistically significant, F(1, 70) = .017, p = .8967.  
These results are, therefore, inconsistent with those obtained in Experiment 1. The 
results suggest that there are virtually no differences between diverse (ten) and limited 
(two) options in either the relevant and nonrelevant conditions. Experiments 1 showed 
modest support for assimilation of the future imagined state to choices that have personal 
relevance and will involve upcoming positive changes. In Experiment 2, however, there 
was not a conceptual replication of the interaction from Experiment 1, even for those 
people who park on campus. Neither experiment found sufficient evidence, additionally, 
to support contrasts in the nonrelevant conditions when the policy change would not be 
enacted in the foreseeable future, despite the larger sample size. There was, therefore, no 
support for a transversal effect of choice on satisfaction and participants in the 
nonrelevant condition did not show preferences for limited over diverse options when 
they would not personally benefit from campus parking policy changes.  
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There are a number of potential reasons why this paradigm failed to capture the 
anticipated options x relevance interaction as a result of contrast and assimilation of 
future options to the current state. It is possible that assimilation of relevant choices did 
not occur in the second study because the data was collected for the first study in the fall 
and for the second study in the spring. The timing, therefore, could affect the personal 
urgency of the policy. It is possible that parking had been resolved by the participants in 
the spring. Parking was chosen as a topic for this study because of its relevance to the 
student sample; unfortunately, some participants did not park on campus and therefore 
the topic of parking was not relevant to all participants. It was anticipated with a 
secondary analysis in Experiment 2 that for participants who do park on campus there 
would be the anticipated options x relevance interaction; this was not supported, 
however. One potential limitation of replicating the results comes from the sample 
characteristics—in Experiment 1, over 51% of participants parked on campus while only 
44% of participants reported parking on campus in Experiment 2. 
It is possible that some people perceive nonrelevant future options differently. 
Thus, collectivism and need for cognition were explored in the relevant and nonrelevant 
conditions to see if people might have a different perception of the options. In general, 
there was no support for the expected exchange of preferences from diverse to limited 
when the campus parking policy change would not go into effect until ten years from 
now. Perhaps there are some people who think and perceive future choices differently 
and would support the anticipated transversal of choice on satisfaction. 
2 
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Individual Differences in Satisfaction from Choice 
Collectivism. Part of the a priori predictions for this experiment surrounds the 
notion of collectivism—showing deference to others relative to the self. Participants‘ 
ratings of cultural identity were taken from two sources—a self-report measure of 
collectivism (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) as well as several questions asked to determine 
participants‘ ratings of caring about campus parking for oneself, friends, and for 
unknown students. These questions were intended to provide a convergent method to 
help explore the implications of how people perceive others benefiting versus the self, 
and in turn, the effect on how one perceives personal satisfaction with what one has. 
Questions pertaining to caring about parking for the self, friends, and unknown others 
were asked along an 11-point scale (from 1 = don’t care at all to 6 = neutral to 11 = care 
a lot).  
Analysis Strategy. First, Luhtanen and Crocker‘s (1992) 16-item Collective Self-
Esteem (CSES) scale was entered and aggregated into four subscales. The CSES 4 sub-
scales are: 1) Membership Esteem which assesses an individual‘s judgments of how 
worthy they are as members of their social groups; 2) Private Collective Self Esteem that 
measures personal judgments of how good one‘s social groups are; 3) Public Collective 
Self Esteem that assesses one‘s perceptions of how positively other people evaluate one‘s 
social groups; and 4) Importance to Identity that assesses the importance of one‘s social 
groups memberships to one‘s self-concept. The subscale that most closely reflected the 
construct of a collectivistic tendency toward caring about future students‘ parking was 
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Importance to Identity. The higher a participant would report one‘s social membership as 
part of their self-concept, the greater the participant would take into consideration the 
needs of other students. 
To show effects of collectivism on current satisfaction, scores of Importance to 
Identity were aggregated. A regression analysis was conducted to evaluate how well 
collectivism predicted current satisfaction with parking. Because results from Experiment 
2 suggest that some of the participants reported their relevance discordantly from their 
assigned condition, these participants were omitted from the analysis. The predictors 
were collectivism, the number of options (dummy coded as limited and diverse), as well 
as relevance (dummy coded as relevant and nonrelevant). The criterion variable was 
satisfaction with one‘s current parking. There was a no effect for collectivism on 
satisfaction, β = -.74, t(140) = -.884, p < .378; additionally, there was a nonsignificant 
effect for options, β = .07, t(140) = .833, p = .406, and relevance, β = .106, t(140) = 
1.263, p < .209. The relationship between collectivism as measured by the Luhtanen and 
Crocker‘s (1992) Importance to Identity subscale and current satisfaction with parking, 
therefore, did not prove to be a significant. 
 Secondly, the self-report measures of collectivism were used as a convergent way 
to determine how people report their feelings toward others. It is conceivable that 
collectivistic participants report caring about others differently from those who are low in 
collectivistic tendencies. In order to determine differences in self-reported collectivism 
and its relationship to current satisfaction, the question asking about parking for the self 
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(a measure for individualism) was analyzed separately from the measures asking 
participants about how much they cared for friends and unknown others (a measure of 
collectivism).  
To demonstrate that the questions were related, a reliability test was performed. 
The two self-report questions that were hypothesized to measure collectivism both 
yielded correlations of at least .59: ―How much do you care about how the parking 
situation affects your friends?‖ and, ―How much do you care about how the parking 
situation affects UNCG students you don‘t know?‖ Not surprisingly, the weakest 
correlations between the items of collectivism and individualism were found (―How 
much do you care about getting better parking?‖). The two measures of collectivism 
were, therefore, deemed conceptually similar and aggregated into a single measure of 
collectivism. 
A regression analysis was conducted to evaluate how well collectivism—as 
measured by the two questions related to caring—predicted current satisfaction with 
parking. Once again, the subset of participants who park on campus were used for 
analyses. The predictors were collectivism, the number of options (dummy coded as 
limited and diverse), as well as relevance (dummy coded as relevant and nonrelevant). 
The criterion variable was satisfaction with one current parking. Collectivism was a 
nonsignificant predictor of satisfaction, β = -.041, t(140) = -.484, p = .629. The number of 
options were not a significant predictor of satisfaction, β = .068, t(140) = .804 p = .423, 
nor was relevance, β = .108, t(140) = 1.264, p < .208. The relationship between 
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collectivism as measured by the questions of caring for friends and unknown others, 
therefore, did not prove to be significant predictors of current satisfaction with parking.
 3 
One potential reason the a priori prediction that collectivism would have a 
differential effect in the relevant and nonrelevant conditions was not supported is that 
participants may not have perceived questions related to parking endemic to ingroup 
favoritism, and therefore, the collectivism measures would not capture the true 
relationship of feelings of deference for ingroup members. The university population is 
heterogeneous and large, therefore future students may serve as a poor proxy for an 
ingroup bias. In addition, the sample was collected from a culture where individualism is 
predominant, and therefore, would poorly reflect the way true collectivists might perceive 
the future relevant and nonrelevant options. 
Need for Cognition. Need for cognition refers to people who enjoy and engage in 
effortful thinking. Research suggests that need for cognition, or NFC, involves a 
tendency to seek, acquire, think about, and reflect back on information in order to make 
sense of stimuli, relationships, and events (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). 
For participants who are high in NFC, it would be conceivable that choices involve more 
careful or detailed consideration about the implications about the options one must 
consider. In following this line of reasoning, it is also possible that for people who think 
carefully about options, imagining a future alternative world might have a larger impact 
on their perceptions of satisfaction relative to those who are low in NFC. Thus, the 
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effects of relevance and choice would have a stronger effect for those high versus low in 
need for cognition. 
A regression analysis was conducted to evaluate how well need for cognition 
predicted current satisfaction with parking. Again, the subset of people who concordantly 
responded to the manipulation check with their assigned relevance were used for 
analyses. The predictors were need for cognition, the number of options (dummy coded 
as limited and diverse), as well as relevance (dummy coded as relevant and nonrelevant). 
The criterion variable was satisfaction with one‘s current parking. Need for cognition was 
a nonsignificant predictor of satisfaction, β = -.073, t(140) = -.857, p = .393. The number 
of options were not a significant predictor of satisfaction, β = .057, t(140) = .673, p = 
.502, nor was relevance, β = .093, t(140) = 1.099, p < .274. The relationship between 
need for cognition and current satisfaction with parking, therefore, did not prove to be a 
significant.  
The relationship between need for cognition and current satisfaction did not show 
the predicted pattern. This might have happened for a number of reasons. Future imagery, 
without being prompted intentionally, might happen at a subconscious level in some 
circumstances (Sanna, 2000; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). If so, the processes that discern 
the thoughtful consideration personified by those high in need for cognition might not be 
captured without the participants being prompted to think (or willfully thinking) carefully 
about the determinants and consequences. Additionally, because the paradigm itself 
might involve a decision that does not require a large amount of thought, all individuals 
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who were willing to spend the necessary cognitive resources to understand the issue 
before them may not have needed to employ them. 
Both collectivism and need for cognition were proposed to explore individual 
differences that might account for the transversal of satisfaction. Although the data were 
unsupportive of differences for participants high in collectivism and need for cognition, it 
is plausible that other individual differences might lead participants to have stronger 
affective reactions to nonrelevant, diverse options whereby they demonstrate perceptual 
contrasts and preferences for limited over diverse options. Social comparison orientation, 
for example, might demonstrate that those who engage actively in social comparisons are 
affected differentially by the knowledge that future choices are intended for others in the 
nonrelevant condition or for themselves in the relevant condition. 
Summary of Satisfaction Results. The results from Experiment 2 failed to 
support assimilation for relevant choices in the upcoming future, even for people who 
park on campus. When choices for future policy changes are upcoming, participants did 
not show the anticipated higher satisfaction with their current situation when they had 
diverse versus limited options. Additionally, there was no support for differences 
between diverse and limited options in the nonrelevant condition. I expected differences 
when the individual difference variables of collectivism and need for cognition were 
taken into consideration. This, however, was not the case. This is perhaps due to a lack of 
relationship between these personality traits and decisions about future relevant and 
nonrelevant decisions. Alternatively, because the analyses only involved people who 
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responded concordantly with the relevance manipulation, there was less statistical power 
because of a slightly smaller sample size.  
To determine why people show tendencies to prefer diverse over limited options 
in relevant future decisions and tendencies for preferences to limited over diverse options 
in nonrelevant future decisions, measures were added to determine how people arrived at 
their decisions about future choices and satisfaction. More specifically, people were 
asked how they perceived the number of solutions presented, the extent to which they 
engaged in mental imagery, the extent to which the future policy would impact their 
current parking, the extent to which the policy will have a personal impact, and finally, 
whether or not focusing on how the future might change influences what participants feel 
about what they have now.  
Decision-determinants of Future Choices. Why do people show tendencies 
toward changing perceptions of satisfaction with their current standing when presented 
with new potential future options that are upcoming versus far away? And how do some 
circumstances positively influence ratings of satisfaction more so than others? 
Satisfaction with one‘s current standing is not immune to future changes. To test how this 
effect occurs, questions related to the decision determinants were posed to participants 
(following the parking scenario and the questions related to satisfaction).  
Number of Options. The first decision-determinant question explored how the 
number of options offered to solve the parking problem affected perceptions of the 
policy. An 11-point scale was used to determine if there were between condition 
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differences in ratings of how good the policy is based on the number of options. A 
univariate analysis of variance was conducted on the mean rating of choices. Participants 
offered diverse (10) choices to solve the parking dilemma rated the number of choices to 
solve the parking dilemma (M = 6.87) higher than participants in the limited (2) options 
conditions (M = 5.78), F(1, 196) = 15.145, p < .0001. 
4
 This suggests that people who 
were offered diverse options feel that the policy is better relative to the participants 
offered limited options. This is consistent with prior tests evaluating satisfaction based on 
the set sizes of choices offered to people (Haynes, 2009; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009). 
Overall, this is also consistent with the notion that relative to little or no choice, people 
generally want a moderate number of options when making choices. 
Future Simulations. Participants were then asked the extent to which they 
thought about what the future might look when considering the parking dilemma on an 
11-point scale. The test value was set at 6, since this number reflected the average, or 
neutral score. If the mean fell below this number, this would indicate that imagining the 
future was not part of the decision, and conversely if the mean represented a number 
higher than the average, this would reflect people imaging the future while considering 
parking. To determine if visualizing the future was indeed part of the decision, a one-
sample t test was conducted. The sample mean of 8.04 was significantly different from 6, 
t(199) = 12.67, p < .0001. Consistent with the literature on mental imagery of problem 
solving and emotional coping (e.g., Sanna, 2000; Taylor, Pham, Rivkins, & Armor, 1998; 
Taylor & Schneider, 1989), participants who park on campus visualized or simulated 
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what the improvements to the parking situation might look like while making a 
determination about the appropriate option as well as to determine how they felt about the 
choices. 
Future simulations are suggested to be a core part of determining how one feels 
about future changes. It is possible, therefore, that when options will not bring personal 
benefit, people simulate to a lesser extent; if this is the case, the simulations might be 
insufficient to drive the affective outcomes predicted with nonrelevant decisions. To test 
this idea, a univariate analysis of variance was conducted. The extent to which future 
simulations impact current feelings was used as the dependent measure. The independent 
measure was relevance (relevant versus nonrelevant) of future parking policy changes.  
Participants offered relevant (policy will be enacted at the end of the year) choices to 
solve the parking dilemma rated the extent to which future simulations impacted current 
feelings higher (M = 7.67) than participants in the nonrelevant (policy will not be enacted 
until the end of ten academic years) condition (M = 6.69), F(1, 198) = 11.40, p < .001. 
Thus, people who were exposed to nonrelevant choices engaged in less simulation about 
how the future makes them feel about their current circumstances. A weaker future 
simulation, therefore, might be responsible for the fact that nonrelevant choices failed to 
show the predicted contrasts and reach significance. 
Current Impact. Participants were asked if the proposed policy would affect 
their ability to park now. This served the purpose of a manipulation check to see if 
participants were more influenced by the proposed policy when it would be implemented 
53 
  
at the end of this academic year (relevant) as opposed to in ten academic years 
(nonrelevant). An analysis of variance was conducted using relevance and whether 
participants parked or did not park on campus as the independent variables and current 
impact now as the dependent measure. Furthermore whether participants did or did not 
park on campus might have an impact in the relevant but not in the nonrelevant condition. 
The ANOVA showed a main effect for relevance, F(1, 191) = 37.28, p < .0001, 
whereby participants who were assigned to the relevant conditions rated the policy 
having a much larger impact on their parking relative to participants in the nonrelevant 
conditions. There was a marginally significant effect for campus parking, F(1, 191) = 
3.851, p = .051, suggesting that people who park on campus rated the policy having a 
greater impact relative to those who do not park on campus. There was, however, a 
significant interaction for relevance and campus parking, F(1, 191) = 9.83, p < .002. This 
effect was due to the fact that there was a significant difference between parkers (M = 
9.51) and non parkers (M = 7.45) in the relevant condition, F(1, 195) = 120, p < .0001, 
but not in the nonrelevant condition, F < 1 (M for parkers = 5.71; M for non parkers = 
6.22).  
Ability. Participants were asked to rate if, when they thought about the change in 
the parking policy, they also thought about whether the parking policy would or would 
not impact their ability to park. Whereas the current impact question was used as a 
manipulation check for relevance, this question was posed to determine the extent to 
which the participant perceived the policy might impact their parking. An analysis of 
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variance was conducted using relevance and whether participants parked or did not park 
on campus as the independent variables and when they thought of the policy if they also 
thought about whether it would or wouldn‘t impact their ability to park as the dependent 
measure. Furthermore whether participants did or did not park on campus might have an 
impact in the relevant but not in the nonrelevant condition. 
The ANOVA showed a main effect for relevance, F(1, 195) = 21.239, p < .0001 
whereby participants who were assigned to the relevant conditions rated thinking more 
about whether the policy would or would not impact their ability to park relative to 
participants in the nonrelevant conditions. There was a nonsignificant effect for campus 
parking, F(1, 195) = 1.017, p = .314. There was, however, a significant interaction 
between relevance and campus parking, F(1, 195) = 8.941, p < .003. This effect was due 
to the fact that there was a significant difference between parkers (M = 6.27) and non 
parkers (M = 4.42) in the relevant condition, F(1, 195) = 9.46, p = .0024, but not in the 
nonrelevant condition, F = 1 (M for parkers = 2.75; M for non parkers = 3.67).  
Future Impact on Current Standing. Participants were instructed that 
sometimes our view of things in the present is affected by our knowledge that things will 
be different in the future. They were then asked to rate to what extent their current 
feelings about parking are affected by their ideas about what parking may be like in the 
future on an 11-point scale. The test value was set at 6, since this number reflected the 
average, or neutral score. If the mean fell below this number, this would indicate that 
their current feelings were not based on imagining the future, and conversely if the mean 
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was higher than the average, this would reflect people‘s feelings being impacted by 
imaging the future while considering parking. To determine if the future was responsible 
for impacting current feelings, a one-sample t-test was conducted on the ratings of all 
participants.  
The sample mean of 7.25 was significantly different from 6, t(199) = 8.58, p < 
.0001. To determine if there was a difference between people who park on campus and 
those who do not, an analysis of variance was conducted with the dichotomous response 
of parking and relevance as the between-subjects factors; ratings of feelings based on the 
future was used as the outcome measure. The ANOVA showed a main effect for 
relevance, F(1, 195) = 12.11, p < .001 whereby participants who were assigned to the 
relevant conditions rated thinking more about how future parking would have an impact 
on current feelings of parking relative to participants in the nonrelevant conditions. There 
was a significant effect for campus parking, F(1, 195) = 6.39, p = .012. There was, 
however, a nonsignificant interaction between relevance and campus parking, F(1, 195) = 
.068, p < .795. 
This was a critical test for the assumption that imagining an alternative future has 
an impact on our problem solving and emotion regulation as suggested by Taylor and 
Schneider (1989). What was less clear, however, was whether imagining an alternative 
future had an impact with participants‘ current standing on a given issue. On average, 
participants responded that a future alternative state had an impact on their feelings about 
their current state. Additionally, for those who did park on campus, and for whom the 
56 
  
parking dilemma had a purportedly even higher personal relevance, rated that the 
alternative future world had an even greater impact on their current feelings relative to 
those who do not park on campus. 
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CHAPTER VII 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Choice is an experiential state that involves the evaluation of two or more 
alternatives (Steiner, 1979). One way choices distinguish themselves is by the number of 
options that are available in any given selection-set. Do we always enjoy choice? The 
present research aimed to address part of the discrepancy between two conceptual 
viewpoints: one has traditionally extolled the virtues of choice (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985; 
Langer & Rodin, 1976; Ogden, Daniells, & Barnett, 2009; Ryan & Deci, 2006; Sheldon 
& Elliot, 1998), and a divergent group that carries a less exuberant portrayal of choice 
(e.g., Ariely, 2000; Burger, 1989; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Mick, Broniarczyk, & Haidt, 
2004; Schwartz 2000, 2001, 2004). While these two studies do not account for the 
discrepancy between these two viewpoints, per se, they propose that certain contexts 
might perceptually change the desirability of options on one‘s current state—more 
specifically, sometimes we might want diverse choices and sometimes we show a 
tendency to prefer limited options or have no preference at all. 
Two experiments explored the effect of choice on satisfaction. In Experiment 1, 
participants read about a campus parking problem and were provided potential solutions 
to resolve the issue. Personal relevance was manipulated in two ways. First of all, parking 
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was chosen as a topic because of its purported high relevance to the sample—
undergraduate students. University campuses often face parking dilemmas, and because 
personal relevance was a key element of the manipulation, it was anticipated that people 
would feel a sense of personal urgency to the topic at hand. Participants were asked to 
consider how to handle the growing problem with parking due to increased enrollment. 
They were either provided limited or diverse options from which to choose to solve the 
parking problem. The second way that personal relevance was manipulated was the 
timing of the implementation of the policy—participants were told that the plan being 
described would be implemented at the end of the academic year or in ten academic 
years. Because students are no longer on campus in a ten year period, typically, this 
served as an implicit sign that the policy would not be personally applicable because it 
would be implemented after the participant graduated; conversely, for those who continue 
enrollment, the policy would be relevant to the extent that it would be implemented at the 
end of the academic year. 
The Results of Experiment 1 showed that when the solution to the parking 
problem was forthcoming, and therefore personally relevant, participants rated their 
current satisfaction higher with diverse over limited options. Moderately more options 
seem enticing because people can visualize an alternative reality with parking solutions 
solving their current dilemma. This alternative reality elicits positive affect that is 
assimilated with our perceptions with what we have now. To the extent that the situation 
is relevant and rewarding, people will assimilate diverse options with their current 
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standing and ratings of satisfaction are higher relative to when choice is limited. Thus, 
when we benefit from choices in the short-term future, people prefer diverse over limited 
choices. 
Conversely, when the parking solution was further in the horizon and would not 
be implemented for another ten years—thus not personally relevant to the decision-
maker—participants‘ rating of current satisfaction hinted at a preference for limited over 
diverse options. More options for parking would appear to be less appealing because it 
does not solve one‘s own parking dilemma; however, this effect was not significant. It is 
possible that participants were unmoved by options because they were not relevant to 
them at all. 
Understanding what we feel about what we have now, therefore, is represented by 
our current satisfaction. These studies lend suggestive evidence that when we think about 
choices for the future, we actively engage in mental imagery that allows us to visualize 
what an alternative reality would look like with the choices implemented. Our choices 
serve as a referent point; when choices are relevant to us, people tend to engage in more 
imagery, and that imagery affects how we feel about our current state related to the 
choices under consideration. The referent point—represented by the number of options 
we are presented—might lead us to assimilate these options with our current state. 
Experiment 1 suggests that to the extent that positive choices are relevant and 
meaningful, a moderate amount of choices (ten) lead us to have a higher current 
satisfaction relative to a limited number of choices (two). 
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What distinguishes the impact of relevant and nonrelevant future choices from 
one another other than the temporal implication? Relevance appears to carry both 
psychological and objective impact; there are concrete outcomes that are forthcoming and 
that immediacy seems to entice emotional and psychological impact. Nonrelevant choices 
lack the objective impact and carry a more nuanced emotional or psychological impact. It 
is possible that people prefer not to engage mental processes when an issue does not 
pertain to the self. Experiment 2 failed to replicate the options x relevance interaction. 
Furthermore, the difference between options in the relevant condition that were suggested 
in Experiment 1 were not found in Experiment 2. 
The failure to replicate the preference for diverse options in relevant decisions 
might be explained by a number of reasons. It could be that campus parking was not 
personally meaningful to enough participants to show the anticipated differences. It is 
also possible that because Experiment 2 was conducted during the spring semester, 
participants had already solved their parking dilemmas and the urgency of the policy was 
not as salient in the spring semester.  
It remains unclear if there are contexts whereby limited options seem preferable 
over diverse options and people rate a higher current satisfaction when presented 
nonrelevant options for the future. It is possible that the meaningfulness of the paradigm 
was such that did not allow for this distinction to be shown. Likewise, it is also possible 
that people simply do not think carefully about the implications of future choices when 
they are not personally beneficial. Participants rated that they engaged in less mental 
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imagery and that the imagined alternative state had less of an impact on the current state. 
It is therefore possible that people are unwilling to engage in the effortful thinking 
required to demonstrate a contrast of diverse options to one‘s current reality when they 
are not relevant. It was also anticipated that individual differences might support the 
preference for diverse over limited options in relevant decisions and limited over diverse 
options in nonrelevant decisions, however this remained unsupported. 
In Experiment 2, it was proposed that people demonstrate individual differences 
in how they perceive choice from decision-making styles and cultural upbringing. 
Theoretically speaking, collectivists have a greater concern for considering the needs of 
people in their ingroup relative to individualists. The implication for future choices 
involves comparisons to what others might or might not receive relative to the self. There 
are two potential implications of collectivism and ingroup favoritism: (1) Collectivists 
should feel less negative affect for not receiving improvements from diverse future 
choices to the extent that they perceive the recipients of the improvements to be part of 
the ingroup; Or, (2) collectivists could, despite their ingroup preferences, perceive a 
greater sense of loss because of their heightened likelihood to compare to what others 
receive. In this case, limited options should be preferable to diverse. 
The second individual difference explored in Experiment 2 was need for 
cognition. Those who are high in need for cognition, and enjoy thinking carefully about 
topics, should be more thoughtful about how the future might look relative to those low 
in cognition. The results, however, did not support this difference. A number of reasons 
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might account for the lack of support. It is possible that participants engaged in 
subconscious imagery, and therefore, did not carefully scrutinize the options as was 
expected for those high in cognition. It is also possible that the parking paradigm did not 
illicit the necessary importance or levity to encourage more thoughtful processing. 
Unfortunately, neither of these potential outcomes was supported. First, there was no 
direct support for collectivism as measured by the Importance to Identity subscale. The 
second way that collectivism was measured was asking people how much they cared 
about parking for their friends and unknown students. This approximated the extent to 
which they felt collectivistic feelings toward other people who were in the context to 
potentially benefit from improved parking. There was insufficient support for the 
questions related to caring about parking for friends and unknown others.  
Experiment 2 explored the decision-determinants associated with the interaction between 
relevance and choice on satisfaction found in Experiment 1. It was predicted that when 
people consider changes in the future, they simulate an alternative reality and compare 
that with their current situation. The underlying assumption was that the movement in 
satisfaction with one‘s current standing came from imagining how something might be 
different in the future from how it appears currently. Mental imagery of a future world in 
which the problem is better is a common part of problem solving (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, 
& Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989) and making plans (Oettingen, Pak, & 
Schnetter, 2001).  
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If mental simulations of a potential alternative future outcome influence 
participants‘ ratings of current satisfaction, they should respond positively to making 
appraisals of a future alternative world with a new ending (e.g., happy to have improved 
parking or disappointed to not profit from the changes in the future). These results 
support the idea that people do mentally simulate how the number of choices will change 
their fate, and in doing so, these simulations affect their perceptions of what they have 
now.  
Mental simulations have been proposed to be a normal part of decision-making, 
planning for the future, and managing our emotions while preparing ourselves for action. 
They have an additional affective implication to the decision-maker because the 
simulation should provide a referent to the current standing. Visualizing an improvement 
in parking or understanding that an improvement that can be visualized will not happen 
any time soon has emotional implications for the person faced with giving input to solve 
a problem. People faced with making choices, but who will not receive the benefit from 
the choices, report engaging in mental simulations to a lesser extent than people who will 
benefit. This might be due to indifference or reserving cognitive resources for more 
meaningful decisions. It is likely that because people were unwilling to engage in 
simulations as much in nonrelevant contexts that the expected strong preference toward 
limited over diverse options did not occur. 
The literature diverges on how many choices one should optimally have. Overall, 
participants report wanting diverse relative to limited options in the relevant condition. 
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Participants responded that the solutions were better when there were diverse options 
versus limited. This effect is clearly supported in many prior studies (Chernev, 2003; 
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Haynes, 2009; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009). These experiments, 
however, add to our knowledge of how positively perceived choice truly is; diverse 
choices are only positive to the extent that they will be personally beneficial.  
It is perhaps not as straight forward as Haynes (2009) would have one think in 
terms of the perfect number of options. Choices are probably more contextually bound. It 
is conceivable that expertise might bump the magic number ‗10‘ up; when we possess a 
certain level of sophistication and experience about our choices, ―more might be better‖. 
Conceivably, other decisions that have profound implications, such as field of study at a 
university or a potential mate may feel less rewarding when confined to just a handful of 
choices. Conversely, highly difficult or aversive choices, such as going to war, might feel 
less aversive with fewer options; likewise, cumbersome and mundane consumer 
decisions, such as weighing the attributes while purchasing a new consumer product, 
might feel less taxing with a manageable number of options. 
One limitation of this research is the reliance on self-reports which implies that 
we are consciously aware of our thoughts and how we even come to make decisions 
regarding future choices. While in some circumstances this might be true, it is 
conceivable as well that we are unaware of how we develop our thoughts and feelings 
about a particular choice. Because not all participants parked on campus, future research 
should strive for conceptual replications that are meaningful to all participants. Future 
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research, additionally, should also attempt to create novel, convergent ways of 
discovering how we determine how we feel about future choices and what impact that has 
on what we have now. Novel methods such as in-vivo verbal reports, open-ended 
questions, brain imaging, and studies with behavioral measures might help to disentangle 
the decision-making process and reveal the specific decision-determinants related to 
choice. 
The parking policy paradigm naturally excluded some of the participants for 
either not having a car or opting not to park on campus. It is conceivable, therefore, that 
the problem might have less of an effect for those who do not park on campus. This does 
not necessarily mean that students who do not park on campus have no interest in policy 
changes about parking; however, the strength of interest may have been attenuated and 
the effect more subtle for many of these participants. Future studies should focus on 
topics that have strong relevance to all participants—such as policy changes in 
curriculum decisions, tuition changes, or graduation requirements. With topics of greater 
personal relevance, it is possible that the elusive contrast effect may occur. 
Evidence suggests that we are aware of what others have or are doing relative to 
ourselves; people tend to engage in self-serving biases (Babcock, Wang, & Lowenstein, 
1996; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954). People are thus constantly searching for a better reality, 
visualizing a changed world, forecasting the personal implications, making plans, and 
deciding how they feel about the implications. We reflect back on the past to make sense 
of it, and we look to the future to prepare for action. 
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Research is just beginning to attempt to integrate the divergent theoretical 
viewpoints of choice. Future studies should continue to probe the types of choices we are 
confronted with, the optimal number of options, appropriately meaningful choices, 
individual differences, and the affective implications of choosing. This research suggests 
that one helpful way of determining how to feel about our current circumstances is 
simply to contemplate our future options. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1
 A subsequent analysis was conducted to explore how parking on campus would 
affect the options x relevance manipulation because conceivably the parkers would have 
the highest personal relevance to the proposed parking changes. The analysis weakened 
the overall interaction, but the means were still in the intended direction. 
2 
The subset of participants who parked on campus demonstrated the predicted 
contrast and assimilation when an outlier was removed. 
3 
The self-report question asking participants how much they care about parking 
for themselves was conceptually different from caring about friends‘ and unknown 
others‘ parking; the latter questions were more representative of collectivism. The 
relationship between caring for one‘s own parking had the weakest relationship with 
caring for friends‘ and unknown others‘ parking, and therefore, the analyses were not 
included. 
 
4 
The decision determinants had conceptually and statistically similar results if the 
entire sample or if just the participants who park on campus were used. 
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Table 1 
Mean Satisfaction with Current Standing For the Limited and Diverse Choices 
Conditions by Relevance and Nonrelevance of Experiment 1 
 
     Relevance 
   ___________________________________ 
Choices  Relevant† SE  Nonrelevant‡  SE 
 
Limited      4.15  .47      5.20   .62 
Diverse      5.67  .50      4.10   .67 
 
† The difference between limited and diverse relevant options was moderately significant, p < .06. 
‡ The difference between limited and diverse nonrelevant options was nonsignificant, p < .18. 
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Table 2 
Mean Satisfaction with Current Standing For the Limited and Diverse Choices 
Conditions by Relevance and Nonrelevance of Experiment 2 
 
     Relevance 
   ___________________________________ 
Choices  Relevant† SE  Nonrelevant‡  SE 
 
Limited      5.17  .33      4.68   .31 
Diverse      5.38  .33      4.61   .31 
 
† The difference between limited and diverse relevant options was nonsignificant, p < .64. 
‡ The difference between limited and diverse nonrelevant options was nonsignificant, p < .87. 
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Table 3 
Mean Satisfaction with Current Standing For the Limited and Diverse Choices 
Conditions by Assigned Relevance and Nonrelevance With Misreporters Omitted from 
Experiment 2 
 
     Relevance 
   ___________________________________ 
Choices  Relevant† SE  Nonrelevant‡  SE 
 
Limited      5.04  .49      4.69   .35 
Diverse      5.47  .40      4.71   .34 
 
† The difference between limited and diverse relevant options was nonsignificant, p < .47. 
‡ The difference between limited and diverse nonrelevant options was nonsignificant, p < .96. 
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Table 4 
Mean Satisfaction with Current Standing for People who Park on Campus in the Limited 
and Diverse Choices Conditions by Assigned Relevance and Nonrelevance with 
Misreporters Omitted From Experiment 2 
 
     Relevance 
   ___________________________________ 
Choices  Relevant† SE  Nonrelevant‡  SE 
 
Limited      5.12  .67      4.75   .64 
Diverse      6.47  .73      4.64   .62 
 
† The difference between limited and diverse relevant options was moderately significant, p < .18. 
‡ The difference between limited and diverse nonrelevant options was nonsignificant, p < .89. 
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Figure 1. Mean satisfaction with current standing as a function of number of solutions 
and relevance (Experiment 1) 
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Figure 2. Mean satisfaction with current standing as a function of number of solutions 
and relevance for participants who park on campus (Experiment 2) 
